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the following translation is of a short passage from die einheit der Sinne 
(The unity of the Senses) by Helmuth Plessner (1892-1985), a leading figure of 
twentieth century philosophical anthropology in germany along with max 
Scheler and arnold gehlen.  originally published in 1923, die einheit der Sinne 
now appears in volume iii of Plessner’s collected works (Plessner 2003).  the 
passage translated here (Plessner 2003, 293-305, 313-315) is extracted from 
the last section of that work, which is titled “the objectivity of the senses”.  
in this passage, Plessner recapitulates some of the major points of die einheit 
der Sinne in order to draw out their philosophical consequences.  the theme 
of the work is what Plessner calls an “aesthesiology” of the senses.  this 
project offers a philosophical account of the nature of sensory perception.  
like some contemporary accounts of perception emphasizing its enactive 
and embodied character, Plessner’s aesthesiology does not neatly map 
onto the classic intellectualist picture of perception as the reception of 
information by a disembodied and disengaged mind.
Plessner seeks to shed light on the nature of the senses by contextualizing their 
qualitative aspects (i.e., as phenomenally conscious) within the whole person.  
besides being phenomenally conscious in sensory perception, a person is an 
agent of “sense-bestowal” (Sinngebung) and is always attuned to the world in a 
certain bodily “stance” (haltung).  the sensory modalities, on Plessner’s view, are 
essentially interrelated with these mental and bodily phenomena, and only this 
integrated whole gives us genuine sensory perception. these ideas interestingly 
anticipate certain claims currently gaining more currency within philosophy of 
mind and cognitive science, like claims that action or the body is constitutively 
(rather than merely causally) bound up with perceptual experience.  Severing 
the sensory modalities from their role in the mind’s sense-bestowing activity 
and its expression in the lived body (leibkörper) is a dead end that will only 
obscure the nature of perceptual experience.
on the basis of the intimate unity of body, mind, and sensory modality in 
Plessner’s theory, the results of his aesthesiology are supposed to not only 
clarify the nature of sensory perception, but also the vexing and longstanding 
philosophical issues of how to understand the mind’s relation to the body and 
to the world.  Plessner argues here that conceiving the sensory modalities as 
the interface between the mind and the body or the world is the only way to 





get past the difficulties inherent in various extant versions of dualism and 
monism.  his proposal has the virtue that it brings mind and body or mind and 
world together without either interposing a dubious tertium quid or leaving 
unanswered precisely how all the terms in question interrelate.  the sensory 
modalities are suitable for the task of crossing this metaphysical bridge due to 
their variety as types of intuition capable of making “objective” (presenting 
to phenomenal consciousness) both mental (in “encountering” intuition) and 
bodily or worldly (in “cognizant” intuition) events within a fundamentally 
unitary structure of intuition.
[293] With sensory cognition as a way of connecting <Verbindung> body 
and mind <geist>, we have found the presupposition for the resolution of 
the initial problem of our investigation.  it was correct [294] to connect the 
question of the objectivity of the senses, an age-old theme of philosophy, 
with the question of the basis of their multiplicity.  For anyone unbiased, 
these themes surely belong together as aspects of one and the same issue.  
through the course of the [present] treatise, admittedly, the epistemological 
problem stood entirely in the background.  the theory of the modalities 
took all [of our] attention.  now we see that this task was not merely of use 
for the problem of objectivity, but is really the basis of its resolution.  We 
would never be able to discern the peculiar sense of a sensory modality if 
we simply proceeded descriptively/analytically and attempted to parse the 
qualitatively different sensory impressions.  a sound that carries over from 
the street, a ticking clock, a door slamming in the distance are certainly 
acoustic phenomena that can be observed with care.  but one is hard pressed 
to discern the acoustic quality of such phenomena.  every attempt to clarify it 
will be disregarded as only a deferral of analysis, [since] it remains something 
irreducible, [something] merely felt in the impression, [and] perhaps one or 
another impressional character can be predicated of it, but typically only 
psychical and physical attendant appearances.  or suppose we turn to an 
optical lived-experience, the view of a house, for instance, or even a work of 
art.  the analyst does not know what to do with it.  if he has separated what 
is objective, what has a phenomenal character <den anmutungswert>, [and] the 
physiological conditions, he will advance to what is ineffably qualitative and 
understand nothing further.  that is how all philosophers hitherto have fared 
who were sincere enough to admit the incomprehensibility of the sensory 
qualities of directly accessible nature, but [who] unfortunately replaced direct 
access with something else.  a question arises in that regard.
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had anyone ever made this observation, then the next logical step 
would be to devise an indirect method of inquiry for bringing nature 
to expression in this way.  Just as Kant [295] attempted to replace an 
immediate theory of objects <Objekttheorie> with the epistemology of objects 
<Objekterkenntnistheorie> (and that meant for him a critique of exact natural 
science), likewise must the theoretician of sensory qualities introduce those 
accomplishments1 <leistungen> that are possible on the basis of one and 
only one quality (modality).  only the perspective of the accomplishment 
allows one to inquire meaningfully about the specific properties of a quality 
(modality).2  Only what the senses specifically make possible constitutes the 
legitimate content of their critique.  they should be understood by their 
fruits.  For that reason, aesthesiology broadens the field of investigation 
and spreads it out over the entire domain of human activity, tracking down 
those consequences that come about with the help of only one sensory 
modality, only one sensory quality.  the secret of the indirect method of 
inquiry consists in leaving the task of isolating a sensory quality not to the 
scholar’s artifice, but allowing the isolation to be carried out by human 
culture and taking note of its results.  in that case, philosophy does not have 
in its purview any useless analytical deferrals, but has viable, meaningful 
products of a synthesis of mind and sensory modality, and [it] can recognize 
its peculiarities in the specific forms of mental sense-bestowal <Sinngebung> 
in this or that material.  is it not much more likely that mental life takes 
whatever is useful from the sensory content of everything, and [that] in 
the course of its history [it] will not very easily miss any possibility for 
deployment that is it is given by virtue of the nature of the senses?  even 
the greatest scholarly effort is ephemeral, compared to the ongoing labor 
of human generations.  in the immeasurable urge for expression and ever 
new expression, in the constant need to replace past accomplishments with 
[something] unfamiliar, [something] original, [the urge] to improve upon 
and displace the old with what is new and fresh, the human spirit, as far as 
we know of it, is never satisfied and is in this manner the harshest critic of 
itself and its ways.  What was to be achieved in this kind of existence must 
have been known to the human spirit long ago in its accomplishments.  the 
bounds of its efficacy, understood as the limits [296] of its essence and its 
1 there is no apt english equivalent to the german term leistung (also importantly used by 
husserl).  the notion is meant to capture a performed action with a determinate end result.  
“Performance” and “achievement” are thus alternate renderings.  “accomplishment” has 
connotations of both an action undertaken and something achieved therein.
2 one should take note that Plessner frequently uses “quality” and occasionally “mode” as 
synonyms for “sensory modality.” – translator’s note
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manner of being, are the subject matter of philosophy, although perhaps not 
exclusively.
in the course of history and in our own time, the human spirit has developed 
with full vitality only geometrical sense-bestowal in the pure element of 
the optic mode [and] only musical sense-bestowal in the pure element of the 
acoustic mode.  Painting, sculpture and architecture indeed move principally in 
the element of the optic mode, although not purely.  their sense-bestowal stops 
short of objective significance, [since it is] also partially formed in collaboration 
with several sensory qualities.  the same holds for the verbal arts in all their 
levels of complexity, from lyrical poetry to theater.  As polar configurations 
of the mind, geometry and music make possible for aesthesiology a decisive 
backward reference to the essence of the modalities in question, purely in the 
form of sense-bestowal (the former as schematic, the latter as thematic) [and] 
purely in the material of sense-bestowal (in the one case optic, in the other 
acoustic).  each mode affords use of a particular mental function in a particular 
sense.3  musical expression, as people say, is addressed to feeling, [and] 
geometrical expression is addressed to the understanding.  Both configurations 
thus correspond to the different values of different forms of conduct.  the realm 
of aesthetic value employs a different kind of conduct for the person than the 
theoretical realm in order to make intelligible its specific sense of validity.  
that indicates that forms of conduct correspond to manners of mental sense-
bestowal, that sense and [bodily] stance <haltung> rigorously determine one 
another in accordance with the law of sequential levels of ordered functions, 
[and] so sensory quality and form of stance <haltungsweise> stand in a precisely 
comprehensible essential connection.
the form of sense-bestowal and the form of stance always correspond to 
one another by means of a sensory quality, [since] the modality constitutes 
the basis for the possibility that a particular kind of mental function gains 
material shape <gestalt>, employment in physical data, [or] expression 
in physical symbols.  the modality, as the theory of accordance shows, 
is the form that is needed for a connection between the mind (as the 
unity of sense-bestowal in [297] its manifold functions) and the lived 
body <Körperleib> (as the unity of stance in its corresponding functional 
multiplicity).  the immediate musical determination of bodily stance by 
means of sensory contents, which are naturally emphasized, is only possible 
in the acoustic mode, [and] immediate geometrical direction through 
3  on this matter, see especially chapter 2 and 3 of Part three. – translator’s note
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schemata for bodily stance (in actions) is only possible in the optic mode.
but is the essential analysis of the qualities exhausted with that?  life shows, in 
fact, that normal seeing and hearing do not in any way need to be connected 
with the presence of geometrical or musical aptitude and practice.  those can 
be erected above the[ir respective]  modalities as mental superstructures.  
animals also see and hear.  do the assertions of aesthesiology then hold only 
for the geometer and musician?  We know that the blind also do geometry, and 
[we] have shown that the aesthesiological truth is not affected by such a failure 
of the modality to appear.  Nor is it aesthesiologically significant if the mental 
utilization of sensory qualities fails.  only the fact that one sort of meaningful 
and pure utilization of certain qualities can arise in general, [that is, the fact 
that] sense-bestowal is connected in a determinate form to determinate 
achievements with determinate sensory material – this fact alone suffices to 
teach us to view the original phenomenon in the appropriate sensory modality.  
Music and geometry, as the specific mental employments of sensory modes, are 
for us only symptoms of what is possible, an aid for understanding what would 
otherwise hide its mystery from us in silent splendor. 
We do not, by virtue of the fact that we interpret a sensory mode, take 
away the muteness essential to it, [that is,] what is qualitatively irreducible 
in an appearance or the sensory nature of what is sensibly [present] for 
consciousness.  We insert nothing into it, as if we wished to say that the purpose 
of the optical mode is to mediate the archetypical directions of consciousness, 
the primal form of the anticipation of goals of movement, [and] the purpose of 
the acoustic mode is to make possible for the body meaningful motivations for 
expressive movements.  that means seeing in the quality of every visual and 
acoustic impression [298] a germinal form for geometrical and musical sense-
bestowal, perpetrating a falsification of the lived experience of the quality [in 
question] to which the psychologist must object with good reason.
the goal of the senses is to inform a psychophysical individual of bodily 
circumstances and natural events.  how does it pull that off, since there 
exist, physiologically, only excitations of sensory surfaces and of the central 
nervous system and, physically, [only] quantitative alterations of the 
material as the stimuli of these excitations?  how is it that consciousness, as 
a bearer of the mind, can perceive external to its body a world of physical 
objects <Körpern> in the excitations of [its own] body in a qualitative 
manifold?  how can a body have an effect on a mind?  the problem of the 
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objectivity of the senses breaks down into these three questions.
the resolution of the problem that forms the core of material epistemology (as 
distinct from formal [epistemology], which deals with the problem of validity) 
is provided with the clarification of the sensory modalities as modalities of 
the connection of mind and lived body <Körperleib>.  body and mind are bound 
up with one another in three distinct ways, [namely,] optically, acoustically, 
and conditionally <zuständlich>.4  these three connective possibilities, 
which are all realized in human beings, correspond to three kinds of sense-
bestowal, [namely,] the schematic, syntagmatic, and thematic, although 
[the correspondence is] not generally direct.  the mind is involved in the 
connection as a unity of sense-bestowal, holistically as in both its thematic 
and schematic function, [and, similarly,] the lived body <Körperleib> [is 
involved in connection] as a unity of stance, holistically as in both the forms 
of expressive stance and action.  to speak of any metaphysics in what we have 
thus accomplished can only be a complete misunderstanding.  nothing about 
the sensory qualities is hypostatized, except what they grant, [namely,] what 
they themselves grant in the accomplishments of geometry and music.   here 
their nature as ways of connecting sense-bestowal (mind) and stance (lived 
body) reveals itself.
but once we have discovered this decisive step in the requisite connection of 
body and mind, then there can no longer be any fundamental difficulties in 
the clarification of the [299] original consciousness of objects.  the mental and 
the physical sides of the human person are surely connected with one another, 
according to this theory, by means of the senses, namely, by means of their 
qualities, without any need for the epistemologist to take offence at this genuine 
μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος [metabasis eis allo genos, transition into another 
genus].5  the subject sees, hears, touches, smells, [and] tastes things with their 
properties in the modalities that are necessary for constituting mind and body 
in the conscious and self-conscious unity of a person, which [i.e., modalities], put 
precisely, represent the qualitative synthetic types of connection between mind 
4  Plessner discusses this division in Part iv of the present work.  the last of these terms, what 
is called zuständlich, has the sense of a “state” (Zuständ), as in a mental state.  Plessner singles out 
in particular with this terminology those sensory experiences that have purely subjective value, 
bearing on our psychophysical state rather than on the objects of experience (see especially 
Plessner 2003, 268). – translator’s note
5  this phrase, taken from aristotle, denotes the error of treating a single subject matter 
within two intertheoretically incommensurate frames of reference.  in this instance, Plessner is 
suggesting that it is not a fallacy (it is, he says, “genuine”).  The justification for that claim follows 
shortly (see especially pp. 301-302).  – translator’s note
the oBjeCtIvItY of the senses
h. PleSSner
26
and body.  the bodily visual, acoustic, tactile, olfactory, [and] gustatory content 
are [also] explained according to their quantitative, spatiotemporal 
determinations on the basis of the physical and physiological process of 
stimulus and excitation.  their qualitative determination is explained as 
a way of connecting lived body <Körperleib> and mind.  the perception or 
the sensation of a sensory object or datum, according to this theory, is 
warranted in its objectivity, [i.e.,] its capacity for grasping the thing, the 
source of stimuli itself.
let us imagine perception for a moment using the image of a thread, one 
end of which is the subject of consciousness, [and] the other end of which is 
the thing or event in space.  then perhaps part of the string is extended as 
a purely physical process, as a radiating movement that is propagated in the 
medium of ether <Äther>, air <luft>, [or] matter <Körper>.  a series of nerves 
links up with it, first of all the excited area in the sensory organ, then in 
the nerves, [and] finally in the brain.  Now there is still a part of the thread 
needing clarification.  For the end does not lie in the brain.  The latter is 
physical, [but] the former should be [something] mental.  the monistic 
theory of parallelism entails that the end would be in the brain, although 
[that would] not [be] comprehensible for the external observer, but only 
for the bearer of this brain himself.  the dualistic theory of spiritualism 
and interaction <Wechselwirkung> goes yet a step further, as it were, behind 
the brain and anchors the end of the thread in the non-spatial object of 
consciousness.  Popular views of the problem are confined to this image of 
perception as a thread between object and subject.
[300]
now, one can never avoid a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος with this sort of 
mutually external and serial linkage <neben- hintereinanderschaltung> of the 
physical and the mental and one must thus operate with something entirely 
incomprehensible, whether one expresses it monistically or dualistically.  
the monist, the dual-aspect theorist à la [gustav] Fechner, cannot 
reconstruct the conscious view of things, their qualitative appearance in 
the objective world, from the components of the physical stimuli and the 
physiological excitations, but remains in fact with these two views and 
asserts only their metaphysical unity.  the physical and the mental are 
arranged alongside one another, but one cannot fold the one view over onto 
the other.  nor does the dualistic interaction theorist clarify the conversion 
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of nervous excitations into psychical or mental acts and contents, [that is,] 
the connection of the two kinds or orders of being, other than through a 
metaphysical hypostatization.
our theory is in fact the only path.  the sensory qualities are forms of 
connection, [they are] the bridges between the mind and lived body 
<Körperleib> and thus between the mind and the corporeal world.  all 
theorems about projection and indication of localization used to explain our 
consciousness of an external world are symptomatic of the impotence of this 
way of inquiring about the connection of mind and body, and [they are] only 
one example of many.  they are unnecessary once one understands sensory 
qualities in the manner we specify.  the theorem that the presentation of 
a tree can be found in the hollow of consciousness and then exteriorized 
again in a “projection” is biased in the image of the serial linkage 
<hintereinanderschaltung> of mental <geistig-seelischem> act and physical 
process; [so is the theorem] that we sense everything in ourselves, in our 
brain, [e.g., in the area] associated with the retina, etc., and [subsequently 
everything] is forced into this exteriorization and projection by means of 
acquired motor experience.  the theorem that determinate processes in the 
retina or in the cerebrum could possess an original property of indicating 
localization for the psychical aspect [is] prejudiced in the same way.
a genuine understanding of perception then has to be attained above all 
first when one once and for all resolves the impossible coupling between 
[301] a physical process and a mind and sharply distinguishes the bearer of 
perception from the mind as the ideal unity of sense-bestowal.  a conscious 
process can neither be “associated” with a physical stimulus/excitation 
process nor does it have any significance if one allows the two series of 
events [to be] in one metaphysical ontic relation <Seinsbeziehung>.  at least, 
that does not resolve the problem of the possibility of perception.  the 
physical process leads from the thing in space to the physical center of the 
perceiving person, whereas the psychical process, according to its sense, 
leads centrifugally from the psychical center to the content that intends and 
presents the thing.  In the first place, the opposite senses <gegensinnigkeit> 
of these two real component parts are essential to perceptual acts. For the 
reciprocity between the subjective advertence of the eye, ear, the skin, etc., 
toward the sensory field and the opposing subjective influx of light, sound, 
pressure, etc., is inherent to the sense of the [mode of] consciousness we call 
perception.  Secondly, the opposite senses of the physical and the psychical 
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real components of perception follow from a reflection on their physical/
physiological and psychological character.
but how – and this is the decisive question concerning the possibility of 
perception – can the psychical components be connected (in spite of their 
opposite directions <gegensinnig>) with the physical components?  it would 
be fundamentally wrong to answer the question by seeking the intermediary 
linkage <Zwischenschaltung> of a mediating, connecting member.  the 
bridge between the psychical and the physical cannot itself be yet another 
materially definable element, since this too must either belong to the 
physical or the psychical order of being <Seinstypus>.  Furthermore, it must 
be remembered that the bridge has to be viable both for the intentional 
interrelation of the stimulus-source (the object) and the sensory content 
in the lived experience of perceiving as well as for the opposite sense of 
the real ontic relation <gegensinnige Seinsbeziehung> that is revealed in the 
scientific exploration of perception as an objective problem.
if one keeps these requirements in mind, then one arrives at the following 
sole possible result: the bridge between the psychical [302] and the physical 
can only be the sort in which both the psychical as well as the physical exist 
objectively <objektiv gegenständlich>.  objectively <Objektiv-gegenständlich> 
existing means, firstly, [for something] to exist in such a way that it can 
possibly be grasped by a subject, [in such a way] that it can become objective 
for a subject.  What is possible for a subject is guided by the highest principle 
of meaningful relations, [namely,] the mind as the unity of possibilities.  
objectively existing means, secondly, existing in such a way that it is 
possible for some matter <einer materie> to come to presentation, to become 
objective.  matter becomes objective, comes to presentation, shows up, 
appears, namely, in the qualities of the senses.
must matter appear straightaway in these and no other sensory qualities?  
our investigation has answered that already in the theory of the 
harmonious system of the modalities: it is only possible in these modes 
as matter for a subject.  all the diversity of what is possible in general, 
which means [what is] meaningful, forms a system, which coincides with 
the system of the sensory modalities in a determinately specified way.  
We have identified in the sensory qualities the manners of application 
<anwendungsweisen> ([by that] we do not mean: forms of application or any 
material of application) of mental sense-bestowal to matter, the ways of 
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connecting mind and lived body <Körperleib>.
thus we are forced to the conclusion that the sensory qualities (both on 
the side of what is formally possibly meaningful as well as on the side of 
what is materially possibly meaningful) present the types of objectivity, the 
possible modes of material existence.  the optic, acoustic, and conditional 
<zuständlicher> domains of modality are the possible modes of our objective 
existence <dasein>, that is, of our being as experienceable for consciousness.  
both physical as well as psychical being are constituted in their qualities, 
that is, as genuinely exhibited content of our consciousness of nature or of 
the mind.  naturally, one should not think that this insight takes away the 
value of the claim that only what is physical is colored, has a sound, exerts 
pressure, etc., but what is psychical does not possess these properties.  We 
can elaborate no further here about how and why the physical content of 
consciousness displays qualities as inherent properties of being colored, 
making a sound, having a smell, [and, likewise, how and why] the [303] 
psychical content, [such as] joy, temper, [and] thought, bears in itself 
qualities as specific phenomenal characters, as value characters and forms 
<gestalten> hitherto hardly grasped.  the widespread notion that the 
qualitative view of nature is, on the one hand, the sharpest criterion of its 
transsubjectivity and materiality, [and,] on the other hand, the subjective 
semblance <Schein> and manifestation <Widerschein> of the psychophysical 
organization of the subject refers in its ambivalence to the qualities’ 
mediating role between mind and body.  moreover, all of our evidence for a 
close connection between sensory quality and bodily stance points to the 
consciousness of the body <leibesbewusstsein>, to which people, especially 
since W[illiam] James, ascribe a central role in the construction of the 
psychical.
although aesthesiology cannot deal with such themes extending into the 
realm of general psychology, not much imagination and competence in 
logical inference is needed to recognize the beginning of a resolution of 
the mind/body problem in the interpretation of the sensory qualities as 
ways of connecting mind and lived body <Körperleib>.  every content of 
consciousness – which means every content that can be characterized in its 
attributes, that presents itself as such – has, in accordance with what we said 
[above] about the essence and kinds of intuition,6 a matter, both physical 
as well as psychical.  For the matter of the physical to be able to appear, it 
6  this is discussed further on pp. 79-87 of this work. – translator’s note
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must be graspable in the modalities of the senses.  For the matter of the 
psychical to be presentable, which means manifesting itself to a subject 
who regards it from within <innewerdenden Beachten eines Subjekts>, it must 
likewise stand in these modalities of the senses, although in an entirely 
different manner than the physical.  We encounter the former as a depicted 
<darstellbaren> content, as a figure, a form of appearance which the psychical 
never takes on, namely, as a thing with the structure of a core possessing 
properties.  We discern the latter from within <finden wir innewerdend> as a 
determinable content, as an interpenetration of determinable properties 
<Bestimmbarkeiten>.  the two [kinds of] matter, physical and psychical, 
however, are equally amenable to salience as contents in general.
this system of functions of intuition, which we have elaborated in more 
detail above,7 only takes into account in this respect the distinction between 
[304] physical and psychical contents when the possible functions of 
intuiting become visible in their peculiar character.  We recognize the type 
of the encountering <antreffenden> intuiting precisely only in relation to 
the physical [matter], [and we recognize] the type of intuiting from within 
<innewerdenden> only in relation to psychical matter.  on the other hand, 
this classification does not at all take into account the commonalities and 
distinctions of [the respective types of] consciousness of the physical and 
of the psychical.  that is because [understanding] the actual consciousness 
of an actual natural object <naturding> [or] an actual mental state does 
not yet enable us to specify the basic mode of presentation.  Within this 
general basic form <grundgestalt> of consciousness, the modalities ([i.e.,] 
the manner of seeing, the manner of hearing, the manner of conditionality 
<Zuständlichkeit>) first determine the possibility of the full perception of 
what is physical or of what is psychical.
one should not overlook here the fact that, in order to establish the senses 
in accordance with all the possibilities of the mind and of intuition, the 
grounding of a harmonious system of sensory modalities has to keep 
itself to the basic kinds of presentative, intuitive [consciousness], and of 
representative, understanding or, rather, sense-bestowing consciousness.  
First of all, a systematic
7  Plessner here refers to pp. 87-91. – translator’s note
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 topology of consciousness is needed.  the sensory qualities are thus 
systematically interpreted on the basis of the laws of concordance between 
intuition, sense-bestowal, and stance, that is, in accordance with the 
contemplative receptive [side] as well as in accordance with the motor 
side.  they are, further, interpreted on the basis of the laws of accordance 
between sense-bestowal and sensory material.  Proceeding on that basis, the 
theory of perception passes over into drawing consequences for the relation 
between mind and material world <Körperwelt> that can be drawn with the 
aid of the interpretation of the sensory modalities as manners of connection 
of mind and matter.
thus one need not additionally yoke oneself to the idea that matter and 
spirit <geist> are the intermediary terms between body <leib> and mind 
<Seele>, [i.e.,] that spirit extends, so to speak, into the mental components 
of perception [and] matter into the physical components, and [that] the 
connection of the two is brought about in that way.  the real components 
and, similarly, the intentional components of perception are rather contents 
of consciousness and the [305] question of the possibility of their connection 
is capable of being resolved neither empirically nor metaphysically.  it 
[i.e., the just-mentioned question] refers to the constitutive problem of the 
experience of what is physical or psychical and of their unification in one 
unitary consciousness.
constitutional problems of the form “how is experience, the apprehension 
of something, possible?” can only be critically dealt with and resolved by 
the introduction of pertinent concepts.  in this sense, Kant introduced into 
philosophy the “forms of intuition” of space and time [and] the “categories” 
as constitutive elements of the objective world.  in our investigation, the 
qualities of sensibility <Sinnlichkeit>, which means [what is treated in] 
aesthesiology, put a new theory of the objectivity of nature, the central idea 
of which includes the theory of the modalities, in the place of the Kantian 
theory of the constitution of nature as it is laid out in the transcendental 
aesthetic, in the theory of the categories and in the schematism.  a modality 
is, on the one hand, more concrete in intuition than [the Kantian forms 
of intuition of] space and time, [and,] on the other hand, more universal, 
since in it the mind comes to be exercised in all its types of sense-bestowal, 
whereas only the physical interpretation of nature had a place in the latter 
[i.e., Kant’s categories].





the theory of the modalities of perception and of perceptual cognition 
makes possible, first, the connection between consciousness and 
physical object <Körpergegestand> or the intentional relation of subject and 
object.  it makes possible, second, the connection of mind and lived body 
<Körperleib> or the real relation of psychical and physical factors in the 
unity of the human person as well as in the unity of the person with his 
environment <umwelt>.  As for the first, we have expressed ourselves on 
that matter sufficiently.  Recalling Kant’s transcendental factors ([i.e.,] the 
categories and forms of intuition) sheds light on the whole issue, but their 
interpretation should not [314] tempt us into further analogies.  a modality 
is something fundamentally different from both a category and a form of 
intuition, although it accomplishes something similar (we do not say “the 
same”).  Space is not the form of external intuition.  rather, the modalities 
are, to the extent that they can really encounter <antreffende> [something] 
in intuition.  [and] time is not the form of internal intuition, of inner sense.  
rather, these same modalities [are], to the extent that they can really intuit 
from within <innewerdende>.  nature and mind are constituted in these same 
modes of sensibility <Sinnlichkeit>, only in various intuitive directions.  but 
since, as we have shown, the sensory modalities are concordant [with] the 
possible stances of the body <leibes>, it therefore follows that the body as 
a unity of stance is the qualitative form and structure <gestalt> in which 
body and mind exist anchored in one another.  this insight shows that our 
critique of the senses immediately includes a theory of body and mind, the 
elaboration of which will be our next concern.
Since realism is beginning to take hold in psychology and the identification 
of the subjective with the psychical [or of] consciousness with the mental 
has been clearly seen to be untenable, significant problems for the present 
are returning that one believed to have been done away with long ago.  a 
self-sufficient mind – whether it now appears substantial like a thing or like 
a whole world of things, [or] whether it appears functional – must satisfy 
determinate conditions as objective actuality.  In the first place, among 
such conditions belongs a perceptual type appropriate to its essence, a 
manner of grasping that is of use only for the psychical.  an inner sense 
(See Scheler 1955 [1919]; Scheler 1954 [1913-1916], especially pp. 393-342) is 
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coordinated with the external senses, internal (psychical) sensory organs 
are coordinated with external sensory organs, as in [Wilhelm] haas (1921, 
chapter ii (pp. 45-92), especially p. 81).  as a consequence of the basic idea 
of securing the objective reality of psychical phenomena, theoretical 
psychology arrives at insights that are of ancient origin.  at all times, the 
mystic consciousness [315] has recognized the sensory life of the soul free 
of the body <leibfreies>.  In the Middle Ages, the theory of the mind’s five 
senses had the character of an assertion about experience; this tradition has 
never been entirely demolished and has even had an influence on profane 
philosophizing.  Our theory of the senses simplifies, in a certain way, the 
state of affairs touched on in those views, although without having them as 
a resource for rendering the profundity and peculiarity of the connection of 
body and mind in the unity of bodily stance. 
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